Read KGI’s full public comment to the UK Competition and Markets Authority on its proposed conduct requirements for Google search here.
There is perhaps no competition regulator in the world that has done as thorough of an investigation into Google’s market power in search, nor produced as compelling evidence of Google’s substantial and entrenched market power, as the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The CMA’s move to introduce conduct requirements to address Google’s market power in search represents the latest opportunity to create the conditions for new challengers to offer more choices for UK consumers. Unfortunately, as KGI notes in our recent comments to the CMA, evidence suggests that the proposed requirements will fail to promote fair dealing or open choices among general search providers in the UK. The CMA’s proposed requirements do not address the key underlying cause of Google’s market power: Google’s control over distribution through default agreements with third parties.
Instead, the CMA has proposed a package of conduct requirements designed to address the downstream effects of Google’s market power. Its Publisher Conduct Requirement (CR) aims to provide a broad swath of web publishers with enhanced controls over how their content is used for search and AI. With this broad framing, the Publisher CR may play a role in shaping broader norms around web crawling and AI-related uses of content. For this reason, the design of the CR is critical. Controls provided to publishers should focus as much as possible on outcomes – uses of publisher content that publishers themselves can objectively discern – while providing for detailed, ongoing oversight if controls are introduced for black-box functions like AI training, fine-tuning, and grounding. The Publisher CR also needs to address the gap in controls for individual creators, including YouTube creators, whose inability to limit Google’s use of their content for its own search results and AI product development is among the most concrete examples of how Google’s market power advantages itself over competitors.
Building on extensive prior work on choice architecture in the context of search, the CMA is also proposing a User Choice CR that requires Google to display choice screens and support more streamlined switching of default search engines. The User Choice CR reflects sound intuitions about the limits of Google’s existing default-switching mechanisms, but its impact will depend heavily on how it is implemented. The CMA should provide more prescriptive guidance on neutral presentation, one click to switch, and mandatory pre- and post-deployment testing. Expanded data reporting requirements and explicit performance benchmarks would facilitate assessments of whether the CR is achieving competitive effects, rather than of formal compliance alone.
Stronger interventions are likely necessary to create the conditions for genuine competition in UK general search services. The CMA’s investigation has established a robust evidentiary foundation for such interventions. As currently drafted, they risk falling short of promoting fair dealing and open choices in general search. Their effectiveness could be significantly improved by strengthening definitions, scope, and implementation guidance.
For a detailed outline of KGI’s recommendations, see the public comment here.
