


JULY 1, 2025

The Technical Feasibility of Divesting Google Chrome

Executive Summary


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Executive Summary

In the *US v. Google* search antitrust litigation, the U.S. Department of Justice and State Attorneys General have proposed that Google divest its Chrome web browser as a remedy for Google's illegal monopoly in online search. This report provides a comprehensive technical assessment of whether such a divestiture is feasible, examining whether a non-Google entity ("ChromeCo") could successfully operate Chrome ("NewChrome") together with its underlying open-source code base, Chromium, to serve the existing four billion Chrome users with a browser that is competitive with today's other major browsers (Microsoft Edge, Apple Safari, and Mozilla Firefox). The report concludes that:

The divestiture of Chrome is technically feasible. Under reasonable assumptions, the engineering required to deliver a competitive NewChrome browser is achievable on a limited timeline, any necessary support from Google can be compelled by court order, and ChromeCo could reasonably expect to be able to retain or recruit the personnel needed to maintain and improve the browser.

A divested Chrome can operate effectively without relying on Google's proprietary technology. Existing Chromium-based browsers such as Microsoft Edge and Brave already offer competitive alternatives without access to Google's internal services or infrastructure. ChromeCo would need to replace or replicate proprietary components (related to audio and video) and numerous proprietary services. Each of these functions has either an available licensing model, proven alternatives in the market, or a viable engineering path forward. In cases such as Safe Browsing and data syncing, transitional support from Google (possibly by court order) could ensure continuity of operation.

A non-Google entity can maintain and develop Chromium independently. The open source Chromium code base is already accessible to the public, and organizations such as Mozilla and Apple have long maintained competitive browser engines without access to Google's internal tools or engineering teams. While Google currently contributes the majority of the code to Chromium, other vendors and independent projects demonstrate that browsers can thrive with smaller teams and more collaborative governance models. ChromeCo would need to recruit or retain browser engineering talent, but the relevant expertise exists both inside and outside Google.

A smooth transition from Google is possible, particularly if the court requires Google to assist. Software update mechanisms, data import from Google accounts, and continued operation of Safe Browsing and other services could all be managed through a combination of technical solutions and court-ordered cooperation from Google. The court would need to ensure that Google provides the relevant technical and organizational documentation and software source code to bootstrap ChromeCo's operations. These steps are within the norms of large-scale software transitions and would allow Chrome's four billion users to move to NewChrome without significant disruption.

A successful divestiture depends on the court imposing clear guardrails that prevent Google from undermining the remedy and that promote browser competition. Strong line-of-business

restrictions prohibiting Google from reentering the browser market for at least 5-10 years are needed to ensure that ChromeCo can build the technical and business foundations to succeed. To help preserve a competitive browser ecosystem, the court should also require that ChromeCo maintain Chromium under an open source model with new governance. Google must relinquish unilateral control of Chromium updates. These provisions are essential to ensure that the remedy delivers meaningful structural change and protects the public interest.

The browser market already demonstrates the feasibility of independent browser operation. Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, and other Chromium-based browsers successfully compete using combinations of open-source Chromium code, independent proprietary services, and third-party infrastructure. Mozilla Firefox and Apple Safari operate entirely independently with different browser engines and have driven major web innovations despite significantly fewer resources than Google.

In short, divesting Chrome from Google is a technically achievable remedy. Provided that the divestiture is structured with appropriate court-ordered cooperation and sufficient transition time, it is technically feasible for ChromeCo to deliver a competitive browser at global scale.

Read the full report [here](#).