

# Did Apple's App Tracking Transparency Framework Harm the App Ecosystem?

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
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# Motivation

- On April 26, 2021 Apple introduced its App Tracking Transparency Framework (ATT)
  - Effectively shifts behavioral tracking (used in targeted advertising) from **opt-out** to **opt-in**
  - Users can block apps from even requesting permission to track
  - Anecdotal evidence suggests ATT greatly reduced percentage of users consenting to tracking
- Opportunity to study the relationship between tracking, data, and the provision of ad-supported goods



# Apple vs. the free internet

Apple plans to roll out a forced software update that will change the internet as we know it—for the worse.

Take your favorite cooking sites or sports blogs. Most are free because they show advertisements.

**Apple's change will limit their ability to run personalized ads.** To make ends meet, many will have to start charging you subscription fees or adding more in-app purchases, making the internet much more expensive and reducing high-quality free content.

Beyond hurting apps and websites, **many in the small business community say this change will be devastating for them too, at a time when they face enormous challenges.** They need to be able to effectively reach the people most interested in their products and services to grow.

Forty-four percent of small to medium businesses started or increased their usage of personalized ads on social media during the pandemic, according to a new Deloitte study. Without personalized ads, Facebook data shows that the **average small business advertiser stands to see a cut of over 60% in their sales for every dollar they spend.**

Small businesses deserve to be heard. We're standing up to Apple for our small business customers and our communities.

Get the full story at [fb.com/ApplePolicyUpdate](https://fb.com/ApplePolicyUpdate)



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# Apple's ATT and the App Ecosystem

- If the profitability of app developers that rely on advertising is affected, incentives to participate in the ecosystem will be affected:
  - Will we see an increase in exit?
  - Will there be a decrease in updates?
  - Will the business model of apps change (ad-supported to in-app purchases)?
  - For apps that remain, how does the valuation of Apps by users change?
  - How does valuation for users differ for apps introduced after/before ATT?
  - Will demand for apps decrease or increase?
- Ultimately, what are the costs of this policy for users in terms of the availability and quality of “free” apps?



# Related Work


- Janßen et al (2022) find that GDPR induced the exit of about a third of available apps in the Google play store and significantly reduced entry
  - GDPR affected Apple and Android's ecosystems equally, whereas ATT only affects Apple's
  - Not only about causality, but also about ability to explore additional questions by contrasting the evolution of the two ecosystems
- Lefrere et al (2024) find that ad-supported news and media websites response to GDPR evolve over time, but find no effect of those responses over websites' ability to stay in business, produce content, and engage visitors
  - Responses are not static. They change significantly over time even within sites
- Li and Tsai (2022) study how ATT has hampered the ability of app developers to attract users through advertising
- Kesler (2022) studies how app developers have changed their monetization strategies after ATT

# Data and Timeframe

- Use data from a provider (AirNow) that tracks all apps in both Google Play and iOS App Store
- Data period: Eighteen-month window around April 2021 policy change
  - Minimizes confounding effects on either ecosystem
  - Long enough to capture pre-trends, and short- and long-term effects
- We study the universe of Apps on Apple's App Store and the Google Play Store.



# Number of Apps in Each Ecosystem Over Time





# Methodology

- We assume ATT is an exogenous shock that only affects the Apple ecosystem
- Difference-in-difference framework. Compare evolution of Google vs Android Apps
- Also employ event-study analysis to check for parallel trends, short-term, long-term, and delayed effects



# Methodology

We analyze several variables

- Entry, Exit, and Update:
  - Related to incentives to keep investing and innovating in the ecosystem
- Use of Software Developer Kits by Apps:
  - Allow us to measure if developers have changed how developers adjust functionalities included in their Apps
- Number of New Ratings and Average Rating:
  - Proxy for demand side effects

# Exit, Entry, and Updates

- If the ability to monetize investments in app development is negatively affected by ATT, we should expect to see less entry
- Similarly, if keeping an app in the market is costly, we should expect increased exit
- In general, cost of keeping an app listed is low. Past research has looked at updates as a measure of continued commitment of developers with the app. However, this measure has limitations:
  - If the app is stable and well liked, incentives to updates may be lower
  - If app is poorly rated, there are more incentives to update

# Exit, Entry, and Updates

- For entry and exit we calculate genre-level entry and exit counts:

$$Y_{p,g,t} = \alpha_1 * PostATT_t * Apple_p + \delta_g + \mu_{g,t} + \epsilon_{g,t}$$

- $p$  = platform,  $g$  = genre,  $t$  = month
- $Y_{p,g,t}$  = Log (1 + Count of Entry/Exit by platform, genre, time)
- $PostATT_t$  and  $Apple_p$  are dummy variables
- $\delta_g$  and  $\mu_{g,t}$  are genre and month fixed effects
- $\alpha_1$  is the coefficient of interest. Measuring degree at which entry and exit on Apple's platform respond to the introduction of ATT

- For updates we use app-level data:

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_1 * PostATT_t * Apple_i + \omega_i + \mu_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

- $Y_{i,t}$  is equal to 1 if app  $i$  was updated during time  $t$


# Exit, Entry, and Updates

	Log Entry Count (1)	Log Exit Count (2)	Update (3)
After ATT x Apple	-0.1634*** (0.0611)	0.0651* (0.0333)	-0.0041*** (0.0001)
Platform-Genre FE	✓	✓	
Period FE	✓	✓	✓
App FE			✓
Cohen's D	-0.3587	0.2732	-0.0186
Dependent variable mean	7.0268	7.2847	0.07768
R <sup>2</sup>	0.91637	0.97163	0.37103
Observations	817	817	87,036,182

Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Reduced entry after ATT?



Looking at the event study plot of Entry shows that:

- Right after ATT is introduced, there is a sharp drop in entry
- Entry recovers a few weeks after
- More than a decrease in interest by developers, this is more consistent to an adaptation period

# Usage of Software Development Kits (SDKs)

- SDKs are third-party tools developers can use to incorporate functionalities in their apps. We focus on:
  - **Monetization:** Use to monetize apps through advertising
    - Examples: Facebook audience network, Google AdMob, ironSource...
  - **Ad Mediation:** Similar to monetization, but connects to multiple platforms trying to allocate impressions to the platform offering higher price
    - Examples: AdMob Mediation Adaptor, ironSource Mediation Adaptor, ...
  - **Payment:** Used for securely processing card transactions
    - Examples: Mastercard CBP, Stripe, Square, Venmo, ...
  - **Authentication:** Allow apps to let users log in using credentials from different platforms
    - Examples: Facebook login, Firebase Auth, Google Sign In, Validator, ...

# Usage of Software Development Kits (SDKs)

	Monetization (1)	Ad Mediation (2)	Authentication (3)	Payments (4)
After ATT x Apple	-0.0258*** (0.0017)	-0.0020** (0.0008)	0.0052*** (0.0007)	0.0062*** (0.0004)
App FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohen's D	-0.0460	-0.0038	0.0171	0.0269
Dependent variable mean	1.2140	0.24741	1.0353	0.51105
R <sup>2</sup>	0.88746	0.86648	0.89495	0.90325
Observations	8,448,364	8,448,364	8,448,364	8,448,364

Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

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# Usage of Software Development Kits (SDKs)

- Decrease in the use of Monetization and Ad Mediation SDKs, along with increase in Authentication and Payments SDKs suggest a shift towards revenue models less centered on advertising
- However, while effects are statistically significant, they are small and indicate trivial differences
- Not all apps rely on advertising to the same degree. Game apps are by a large margin the most likely to use Monetization and Ad Mediation SDKs
  - They show the biggest decline in the use of Monetization and Ad Mediation
  - And the largest increase in the use of payment SDKs

# Changes in Users' Valuation of Apps

- ATT may lead to changes that decrease users' valuations of Apps:
  - Less frequent update can lead to unsolved bugs outdated Apps
  - If Apps adjust their business model towards using more in-app payments or increasing the number of ads, users may dislike the change
  - Advertising, recommendations, and functionalities may become less relevant
- ATT could also lead to positive changes in users' valuations, for example if it leads to a reduction in predatory privacy practices
- We study the new number of ratings received by apps (which is a proxy for the number of downloads, and thus of demand)
- And the average rating of new ratings received (as a proxy for quality)

# Number of Ratings and Average Rating

	Log # New Ratings (1)	No Rating (2)	Avg. Rating (3)
After ATT x Apple	-0.0176*** (0.0002)	0.0105*** (0.0001)	-0.0101*** (0.0019)
App FE	✓	✓	✓
Period FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohen's D	-0.0525	0.0476	-0.0092
Dependent variable mean	0.19973	0.87653	3.9250
R <sup>2</sup>	0.80218	0.58455	0.43475
Observations	78,518,418	78,518,418	9,694,838

Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Declining Ratings?

- After ATT, apps in the Apple ecosystem are receiving fewer new ratings, and lower ratings than before ATT
- As we know ATT apparently is causing developers to update their apps less frequently, let's analyze how ATT affects existing vs new apps
- We analyze ratings during the first month an App is available in the store, comparing Apps introduced before and after ATT
- For existing Apps, we analyze ratings for Apps that are:
  - Not updated after ATT
  - That are updated more frequently after ATT
  - That are updated less frequently after ATT

# Ratings During First Month of Sale

	No Rating (1)	Log # New Ratings (2)	Avg. Rating (3)
After ATT x Apple	-0.0277*** (0.0009)	0.0644*** (0.0027)	0.0087 (0.0112)
Platform-Genre FE	✓	✓	✓
Period FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohen's D	-0.0789	0.0615	0.0096
Dependent variable mean	0.84456	0.39457	4.1814
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05862	0.05374	0.03544
Observations	2,112,133	2,112,133	328,301

Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Ratings: Existing Apps by Update Frequency

	Log # New Ratings (1)	No Rating (2)	Avg. Rating (3)
After ATT x Apple × Zero	-0.0168*** (0.0001)	0.0130*** (0.0001)	-0.0334*** (0.0032)
After ATT x Apple × (Weakly) Higher	0.0034*** (0.0004)	-0.0012*** (0.0002)	0.0133*** (0.0030)
After ATT x Apple × Lower	-0.0319*** (0.0003)	0.0114*** (0.0002)	-0.0086*** (0.0026)
App FE	✓	✓	✓
Period FE	✓	✓	✓
Cohen's D			
Dependent variable mean	0.20093	0.87548	3.9233
R <sup>2</sup>	0.80129	0.58330	0.43389
Observations	77,477,703	77,477,703	9,647,402

Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Summary of Results

- Right after ATT there is a noticeable **reduction in the number of available apps** in the iTunes ecosystem
  - However, **reduction is temporary**
  - In fact, by 3-4 months after ATT, the number of apps had recovered and even **increased** vis-a-vis the Android ecosystem
- There is **no evidence of increased exit or reduced entry in the long term**
- **Update frequency** slightly decreases.



# Summary of Results

- Examining the usage of SDKs suggests Apps may be adjusting their revenue model
- There is a **decrease** in the use of **Monetization** and **Ad Mediation** SDKs
- There is an **increase** in the use of **Authentication** and **Payment** SDKs
- The **effects are statistically significant, but their magnitude is economically trivial**

# Summary of Results

- Number of **new ratings** and **average rating** is **lower after ATT** for **existing apps**
- **Not all Apps** are affected in the same way
- **New apps** introduced after ATT:
  - **Are more likely to get at least one review** during their first month in the market
  - Get more reviews on average as apps introduced before ATT during their first month
- For existing Apps:
  - Those that are **not updated, or are updated less frequently** after ATT get **fewer and lower ratings**
  - Those are **updated more frequently** after ATT get **more and higher ratings**



**Thank you!**